Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

1-1-2003

Truth and Voice in Women’s Rights
Margaret Urban Walker
Marquette University, margaret.walker@marquette.edu

Accepted version. "Truth and Voice in Women’s Rights" in Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights
Feminist Ethics and Social Theory . Eds. Robin N Fiore and Hilde Lindemann. Lanham, Md.: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2003, pp 169-180. Publisher link. This material is still protected by copyright. All rights
reserved. Please contact the publisher for permission to copy, distribute, or reprint.
Margaret Urban Walker was affiliated with Fordham University at the time of publication.

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Truth and Voice in Women’s Rights
Margaret Urban Walker
Department of Philosophy, Fordham University
Bronx, NY

Truth commissions are a remarkable and novel political
institution of our time. A truth commission is an official body “set up to
investigate a past period of human rights abuses or violations of
international humanitarian law” (Hayner 1994, 598). With the
successful Latin American examples of the 1980s, over 20 truth
commissions have been formed to date.i South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, described by political theorist Elizabeth
Kiss as “the most morally ambitious truth commission to date” (Kiss
2000, 70), set a new standard with its public testimonies of victims
and perpetrators, aimed at restoring “the human and civil dignity of
the victims,” a phrase that occurs repeatedly in its documents and its
1998 Final Report.ii
In the trend-setting Latin American cases truth commissions
operated in the context of blanket amnesties shielding wrongdoers
from criminal prosecution for precisely the offenses the commissions
documented, so that truth commissions have been burdened with the
reputation of being a “second best” proposition. Even so, their mission
of truth-finding and truth-telling is increasingly recognized, around the
world, as essential. Truth-processes other than truth commissions
have been implemented in recent years as well. Following the fall of
Communist governments, (then) Czechoslovakia adopted “lustration,”
barring those who were on membership lists of secret police or various
Communist Party organizations from holding public offices for five
years. East Germany combined lustration with opening the Stasi
(secret police) archives to those on whom the files were kept (see
Curry 2000; Garton-Ash 1997; Rosenberg 1995).
While truth-processes have proliferated over the past twenty
years, the idea of a right to the truth as a human right is fairly new. It
has emerged out of the practice of truth commissions and other truthprocesses rather than preceding them. The idea of “rights to truth”
implies something stronger than the importance, or value, or positive
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effect of the truth. It places truths, at least of certain kinds, or under
certain conditions, in the category of a something claimable for oneself
from others, where the claim has both moral legitimacy and urgency,
and where the claim presumes the obligations of some parties to effect
or enforce it. Rights to truth in cases of gross violations of human
rights, like massacre, disappearance, or torture, have been understood
as rights of victims, families, and societies to know or be told the truth
about these matters, as well as rights to have the truth sought
through impartial investigation.iii Even in the case of gross violations of
human rights, however, not everyone’s truths are equally likely to be
sought or told. Priscilla Hayner, in the most comprehensive study of
truth commissions to date, cautions, “Perhaps the most commonly
underreported abuses are those suffered by women, especially sexual
abuse and rape” (Hayner 2001, 77). Hayner points to the stigma and
shame that may silence women=s reports in many settings, but she
also notes tendencies to see sexual violation as “secondary” or “added
on,” or as individual whims, rather than primary violations.
There is a good deal to be learned from, and a good deal to be
done about, the persistent impediments to speaking and hearing the
truths of women’s lives. I will argue that rights to truth must
encompass rights to voice B to be an authoritative teller of the truth
about one’s life and experience B as well as rights to know certain
truths or to have them sought by others, and that these rights are as
important to confronting cases of historically long-standing and
systemic oppression as they are in addressing those episodes of
violence usually called ‘gross violations of human rights.’ These are
lessons to be drawn from feminist and other liberatory theories that
make the possession of “voice” central to social justice and individual
freedom. I will also argue that rights to truth B to its being told, but
also to telling it B are not only instrumental but are fundamental rights
for women and men, for they secure the moral, civil, and political
dignity of those, including most women, who have been systemically
silenced and epistemically discredited. In these ways they have been
denied not only opportunity, equality, or well-being, but denied
effective moral agency itself.

Truths and Tellings
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Rights to truth have been invoked in cases where the truths are
those called ‘gross human rights violations,’ such as extrajudicial
killings, torture, disappearance, arbitrary detention and inhumane
treatment. These terrible truths that shatter, suspend, or corrode lives
of their victims and others are not “unknown” to all; they are known to
perpetrators and to living victims and sometimes to many others. But
they are often known incompletely or without detail. In the case of
extrajudicial killings and massacres, the living may “know” without
being able to verify details or find the remains of their loved ones. And
even when some possess the truth, it can be denied, or remain
without public legitimation, known but not acknowledged.iv Many
women have been among those who fought for the truth about others
they loved, as did the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and
the Mothers of El Salvador and women marching in the Plaza of
Martyrs in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The South African Commission,
concerned that its human rights hearing drew many more women
testifying about brutality to others than violations of their own rights,
organized hearings specifically for women to come forward.v Whether
truths are pursued by women or men, and whether they concern
women or men, rights to truth have been invoked in a special kind of
case, the case of state-sponsored or other organized violence hidden
and denied. So it might seem that rights to truth are essentially rights
to have certain truths discovered or acknowledged. And it might seem
that rights to truth are not fundamental human rights, but rather that
claims to truth are instrumental to the protection or exercise of other
fundamental rights, like securing justice. I argue against both of these
assumptions, that rights to truth incorporate rights to speak one’s
truth, and that the standing to speak as well as know is constitutive of
moral agency, rather than instrumental to some of its exercises.
Rights to truth do not appear in the U.N. Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Nor do they figure in U.N. conventions concerning
torture or genocide. Some U.N. documents, like those on Enforced
Disappearance and Extralegal Executions mandate “investigations,” as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch urge in all cases of
gross human rights violations. And a 1997 U.N. recommendation to
combat impunity speaks of “full and effective exercise of the right to
the truth.”vi Yet among earlier U. N. documents, CEDAW (the U.N.
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened
for ratification in 1980) is interesting in this respect. Although it does
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not speak of rights to truth, CEDAW requires eliminating “prejudices”
about women and women’s and men’s roles and “customary and all
other practices” that support prejudices of women’s inferiority.vii It
specially features basic education, as well as career, vocational, family,
health, and family planning information. It is more detailed in its
coverage of provisions for participation in public and political
associations and entities, national and international, than is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
I think it is not an accident that so many provisions of CEDAW,
growing out of women’s movements, go closer to rights to truth,
including rights to voice, while also directly addressing rights to work,
credit and economic agency; rights to reproductive control, marital
consent, and maternity provisions; and rights to protection from
sexual exploitation. I see CEDAW as responsive to a complex of
assumptions of feminist activism and theory that are shared with other
twentieth century liberatory movements for rights that address
oppressions based on group membership. The assumptions are these:
1. Important truths may not just be “there” for the
knowing.
2. Truth is necessarily an interpersonal and social
achievement that requires social, discursive, and material
conditions.
3. Getting certain truths told requires political will and is a
matter of justice.
4. It is an indignity to have one’s identity or community
represented by lies, and to have to live with those lies.
5. It is a constitutive element of dignity to be a possible
bearer of truth about one’s experience of oneself and the
world.
6. The dignity of human beings is not acknowledged and
enacted where human beings do not have initiative,
access, and voice concerning what is true of their world
and in their lives.viii
On these assumptions it is not only unspoken truths about what
are often called “unspeakable” acts of violence and brutality that must
be retrieved, released, and publicly acknowledged. It is also crucial for
human beings to be able to find and tell truths that are “unspeakable”
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in other senses. There are truths unspoken out of despair,
intimidation, or strategies of self-preservation under desperate
conditions. There are truths that await telling because the vocabularies
and forms of thought that will retrieve or release them are not yet
available, or are not widely understood. There are truths that cannot
yet be said in places and by people where they can have real
interpersonal, social, and political effects. And there are truths whose
tellings and tellers are discredited by the authority of others.
This is why rights to truth matter not only in the cases of
wrongs classified as gross violations of human rights. They are critical
also to breaking the grip of long-standing systemic and cultural
oppressions justified by reference to history and customs. The
appreciation of this is one of the achievements of feminist, race,
postcolonial, and gay and lesbian theory and politics, which have
always been in important part works of truth and politics of truth. It
also figures centrally in movements of Native, Aboriginal, or First
Nations Peoples. The truth by itself does not set people free, but
people’s abilities to set themselves free -- to claim freedoms and
establish their dignity B do depend critically on their initiatives, access,
and voice concerning what is true of their world and their lives. To say
that we have a moral right to truth is to say that we have urgent and
legitimate moral claims in this regard, and that these claims are not
only reserved to “moral emergencies” or the kinds of extreme episodes
of mass violence that tend to be called “human rights disasters.”ix
Contemporary liberatory theories that emphasize voice have
long recognized the stakes in suppression or denial of histories of
injustice and destruction. These theories take seriously powers to
silence as working parts of oppressive social and political
arrangements; they see as fundamental the powers to speak that
oppressive arrangements are careful to block or destroy. Philosophers
Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman expressed it this way in their
brilliant 1983 essay “Have We Got A Theory For You!” Women’s having
“voice” is necessary both as a way to “increase the chances that true
accounts of women’s lives will be given, but also because the
articulation of experience (in myriad ways) is among the hallmarks of
a self-determining individual or community” (Lugones and Spelman
1983, 574). This way of putting it brings out two issues that have
intertwined throughout several decades of feminist theories and
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women’s movements: the importance of revealing and responding to
the actual truths of women’s different lives, as well as the necessity for
women to be able to speak those truths out of their own mouths, with
a presumption of basic credibility and authority. Rights to truth involve
both rights to know the truths and rights to tell the truth.

Preventions of Truth and Speechless Standings
Although sometimes we speak of the truth when we mean “what
really happened” or “what the facts are,” a truth is, more precisely,
something told (that is, asserted or represented). What makes
assertions or representations true is something in or about the world,
something that in some cases can be established easily (e.g. looking
and seeing) or in others can require complex procedures (e.g.
techniques of forensic pathology). What is true, however, is something
that someone says, or otherwise depicts or represents, as being so. A
truth is a telling or other representing that has to be told or made or
“put forward.” Bringing or putting the truth forward requires the will or
motive to do so, the means to do so, the opportunity to do so, and the
standing to do so. Truth commissions after eras of grisly and appalling
violence bring forward truths that those who had power did not permit
to be told publicly at expense to their power, and did not fear would
ever be told. In these situations, there is not only an absence of truth,
but what we might call, looking at truth as something told or brought
forward, a prevention of truth.x
But everyday, longstanding, historically embedded oppressive
practices exhibit these same “preventions” of the truth. Those
empowered and entitled by oppressive arrangement do not care about
or will not accept the truths about what the arrangement is, why it is
oppressive, what suffering and destruction it visits, and what benefits
and immunities it allows them to enjoy. So every movement for
liberation from injustice, humiliation, or cruelty needs not only to
challenge an oppressive system or a practice, but to enunciate the
truths, sweeping and small, of what that system really is. Often it is
necessary to invent the language and symbolism that is capable of
bringing those truths forward. Often it is necessary to overcome
powerful feelings of fear or despair in speaking. Even when those with
interests in certain truths and the will to speak them do have the
expressive means to put them forward, they may still not have access
to places where what they will say can be heard or understood in ways
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that can have an effect. And finally, it is possible to make truths
“unspeakable” by disabling the ability of some to have their words
“count” in exactly the ways they are intended to, even if they succeed
in speaking.
The last form of silencing is the least familiar, but no less
important. To have voice is not only to be able to speak, and not only
to be able to be heard, but to be able to speak and be heard as saying
the kind of thing that you are intending to say. Philosopher Rae
Langton explains it this way: “Attempts by the slave to order or forbid
[his master]...are unspeakable for the slave. Something has silenced
his speech, not in the sense of rendering his spoken words inaudible or
written marks illegible, but in the sense of...preventing those
utterances from counting as the actions they were intended to be”
(Langton 1993, 316). What is preventing this is not in this case his
being gagged, threatened, hidden, or secluded, or his lacking the
imagination, concepts, vocabulary, or initiative. It is his social and
legal place, a standing that is precisely a lack of standing to issue
anything that could amount, within that social and legal system, to an
order to his master.
Such speechless standings, for women, enslaved persons, or
members of subject populations can be, and typically have been,
written in the black letters of law, as when certain persons cannot give
anything that counts as testimony in a court, or have no standing to
enter legal actions or complaints. Such standings are also constituted
by institutionally backed authorities whose certified expertise includes
the power to declare what some people say as chatter, as
symptomatic of irrationality or incompetence, as politically proscribed
and outlawed speech, or as perversion or filth that in itself shows its
source to be discredited. The educational, medical, religious and other
authority or expertise of powerful men (and sometimes women) has
often been exercised to disqualify the speech of women in these ways.
These speechless standings can be constituted as well by reigning
definitions of such terms as “politics,” or “development,” or “family” or
“marriage,” so that certain people’s assertions about these matters do
not qualify as relevant views.
In a startling example, Priscilla Hayner reports that
commissioners on the Amnesty Committee of South Africa’s TRC
disqualified an application requesting amnesty for rape without serious
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consideration because they could not see how rape could be “politically
motivated” (Hayner 2001, 79-80). Under statutes for the new
International Criminal Court, sexual violations of women are in fact
under many circumstances war crimes or crimes against humanity.xi In
February, 2001, guilty verdicts on three Bosnian soldiers at the
International Tribunal at the Hague for the first time defined rape as a
crime against humanity, and found holding the women in captivity and
raping them a form of enslavement. Still, specifically sexual slavery
suffered by women in many wartimes contexts is not yet
acknowledged, nor is the category of genocidal rape yet in law
(Simons 2001b; Vidovic 2001). Lawyers defending the three Bosnian
Serb soldiers who were found guilty in February, 2001, of raping,
torturing, and enslaving Muslim women in the town of Foca in Bosnia
in 1992, claimed that “rape in itself is not an act that inflicts severe
bodily pain” and that prosecutors failed to show that the raped women
“were exposed to any severe physical or psychological suffering”
(Simons 2001a). Rape as violation, torture, and political strategy
remain even now difficult to speak if not unspeakable in some
quarters.
The vocabulary of rights, when it is available to someone with
the socially recognized and protected standing of a bearer of rights, is
itself an example of a socially empowered form of speech without
which certain kinds of things are virtually impossible to say. Without
the vocabulary that has some of the meaning and function that the
vocabulary of “rights” now widely possesses, some assertions can only
be seen as preferences, requests, pleas or complaints, rather than
claims that require consideration or demands that must be met. So
closely is the concept of “right” connected to the standing to enter
claims for consideration, that to paraphrase one well-known
philosopher, transposing the gender of his pronouns: To respect a
person, or to think of her as possessed of human dignity, simply is to
think of her as a potential maker of claims.xii Rights to truth imply
claims to being a maker of assertions that embody a point of view and
to be a possible bearer of the truth in what one asserts. A variety of
material and social resources are needed, however, for that standing
to be real and effective.
Because intimidation and violent or costly reprisals are so often
the conditions under which women decide what truths to speak, full
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legal capacity and recourse to civil and criminal law, as well as
opportunities for economic survival, are essential for women to tell
their truths. Literacy and at least primary education are indispensable
for women to get and use the information that allows them to see their
lives accurately both as they are in reality and as they might otherwise
be, as well as to share this information with others. Further, it won’t
matter what women have to tell if they cannot be heard telling it in
places where it can have an effect. Women’s access to public speech
that is not simply ignored or discounted requires access to public roles,
public spaces, and public media or venues of expression. The idea of
“public” as opposed to “private” spaces is perhaps too closely tied to
Euro-American political formations to be the right one for all contexts.
The point is that women’s speech needs to be able, where women
choose, to enter spheres beyond the personal, familial, domestic, or
other borders that often confine it to women’s disadvantage.
A right to be a teller of truths involves basic authority to assert,
opine, testify, deny, contravert, or refuse, to be perceived as the
possessor of a point of view and a possible bearer of truth. But that is
not enough. People also need the opportunity to participate in
processes that set forms of speech and standards of credibility. People
need opportunities to enjoy some control over, if not access to, the
forms and positions of expertise that shape cultural assumptions and
social dialogue. I find it increasingly hard to see how in particular
women’s initiative, access, and voice concerning what is true of the
world and their lives can be more than remote possibilities without
aggressive measures to insure not only political participation, but
something closer to proportionate representation in the main local and
society-wide institutions of governance that rule women’s and men’s
lives. Inuit people in the new Canadian territory of Nunavut
considered, but narrowly defeated, a system of dual-sex political
representation (DePalma 1999). France recently adopted a legal
requirement for equal numbers of women to be fielded by political
parties in almost all elections (Daley 2001). These are measures that
address the need to dismantle the disabling of women’s speech
structurally at both the highest levels of social organization and on a
society-wide scale. The same need exists in places of education and
culture-making, where bodies of knowledge and the vocabulary and
symbolism for socially authorized expression are propagated.
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The link between voice and truth has consequences for
understanding women’s situations and for women’s understanding
their own situations. One example is the use of “adaptive” or
“deformed” preferences (or in an older idiom “false consciousness”) to
explain women’s apparent compliance or complicity with unjust and
even painfully oppressive arrangements.xiii When women’s behavior
that conforms to unjust or oppressive norms is explained as a case of
“adaptive or deformed preferences” the women who comply are seen
as actually preferring what is painful or disadvantageous because they
have learned to prefer it. Sometimes it is said that they have
“internalized” oppression. But this is not the only explanation of
compliant behavior, and it is a very different kind of explanation from
one that sees women’s compliant behavior as a kind of adaptation,
that is, a strategy for living with, doing better in, or garnering some
control in a hard, dangerous, or defeating situation. If a woman has
chosen or learned a strategy by which a she protects herself or others
while coping with oppressive or demeaning practices, she may
continue to find these practices very painful, frustrating, or humiliating
from her own point of view. She may very well see them as wrong, or
cruel, or unjust, or shored up by power rather than by right or good
sense. She may see them as the going “game” or “system” that she
cannot change and so must work to protect herself and others within
it.
The difference between seeing “adaptive preferences” in
women’s compliant behavior and seeing strategic “adaptations” is the
difference, as Uma Narayan has put it, between seeing women as
“prisoners” or “dupes” of patriarchy, and seeing them as agents,
however seriously constrained, “bargaining with patriarchy,”
something almost all women in fact do (Narayan 1997, Chapter 2;
Narayan 2000). This is a very great difference, both as an explanation
and as a moral evaluation, in how we understand what women do. One
thing that is necessary, however, to distinguish cases where we are
seeing realistic adaptations despite a woman’s preferences from cases
where we are seeing actual deformations of her preferences
themselves, is to hear women explain their choices from their points of
view. But this is what they cannot do without will, expressive means,
access, and voice. Even worse, however, without will, means, access,
and voice women may not be able to make these distinctions to
themselves, or to make them clearly. This means that without voice it
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is difficult if not impossible to establish a fact of the matter about
women’s behavior and preferences. One might reasonably ask whether
there necessarily is a fact of the matter under these circumstances.
The capacities for self-possession and self-revelation that come with
having a voice go very deep, to the bases of moral agency.

Rights to Truth: Instrumental and Fundamental
Rights to truth and authority in shaping and telling it are
instrumental in combating some especially harmful and defeating
positions in which women can be placed or exploited by more powerful
men and by more privileged women. Rights to truth and telling can
enable women to claim their agency by announcing that they are
negotiating their positions within unavoidable patriarchal structures
the justice of which they do not accept. Rights to truth can be crucial
political instruments. Their exercise can block “gendered nationalisms”
that manipulate gendered identities, symbols, divisions of labor and
resources, or putative “cultural traditions” of sex domination that are
mobilized in national struggles to the disadvantage or subordination of
women.xiv
What rights to truth protect, however, are not only instrumental
goods. They assert one’s standing as a knower of the world and
oneself, especially of the social world and one’s places in it individually
and as a member of collectivities. This standing is not only a means to
other good things. It is a constitutive element of civil, social, moral
and political humanity. The capacity and standing to speak for oneself
about one’s self, and especially about one’s own actions, is intimately
linked to one’s moral being, what has sometimes been called a
person’s “dignity.” Here, briefly, is one explanation why.
We show how our behavior is human action by expressing our
intentions, giving an account of what we are doing from our own point
of view. We learn from others to give these accounts of ourselves, and
we learn to elaborate, defend, or concede them, by doing so with
others. When we are able to do this we are accountable for ourselves
and to others, and so can be held to account. When women are
silenced as self-describers of their actions and choices they lose, or
never gain, the status of self-accounting actors in relations of mutual
accountability. This is a roundabout way of saying: they lose, or never
gain, the most basic status of a moral agent.xv Further, when anyone
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is denied the standing to report for common consideration her or his
experience, she or he is effaced even as the holder of a point of view,
much less a moral actor with powers of agency, choice, and selfunderstanding.
Rights to truth and its telling are both instrumental and fundamental.
For women who are disadvantaged and oppressed, they are a lifeline
to the claiming of other rights. But for women and men they are also
the emblem and embodiment of civil, political, and moral humanity.xvi
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Notes
i. Central sources on truth commissions include Hayner 1994, 2001; Steiner
1997; Rotberg and Thompson 2000. Krog 1998 is a riveting first person
account of South Africa’s proceedings. See also Wechsler1990 for the stories
of Argentina’s and Brazil’s ways of addressing a repressive and violent past.
ii. The Final Report (1998) of the TRC is available in online form on its
website, www.truth.org.za, which also displays the founding documents and
related material.
iii. See Méndez 1997, 261-2, on the “emerging principles” of victims’ rights to
justice, truth, and compensation, and on the right to know the truth as “a
customary international law norm.” Neier 1999, 40-1, argues American
support of violently repressive regimes in Latin America made “deniable forms
of repression” (like disappearance, secret detention and torture, and death
squads) essential, and hence defined truth as the main battleground and
focus of human rights organizations in the 1980s.
iv. The distinction between knowledge and acknowledgment figures
prominently in literature on truth processes. The distinction in this context is
credited by Lawrence Wechsler to philosopher Thomas Nagel: “It’s what
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happens and can only happen to knowledge when it becomes officially
sanctioned, when it is made part of the public cognitive scene” (Wechsler
1990, 4).
v. See Chapter 16, “Truth is a Woman,” in Krog 1998.
vi. Quoted in Hayner 2001, 184.
vii. This is one of the areas, Article 5 of CEDAW, to which the United States
government makes a reservation in signing the treaty, based on U.S.
constitutional protections of privacy.
viii. Young 1990 is the most comprehensive development of a “participatory”
paradigm of justice that underlies much contemporary liberatory theory.
ix. Jonathan Glover uses the phrase “moral emergencies” in Glover 2000,
408.
x. As interesting, in episodes of mass violence and severe repression, those
with power rely on special euphemistic code languages and expressions so
that even they often do not in fact tell each other or themselves the precise
or whole truth, from bureaucratic euphemisms of the Final Solution to the
contemporary code languages of torturers and free-handed security police
wherever they operate. See Glover 2000 on distancing strategies, which
include euphemism and “cold jokes” concerning torture and killing. See also
Jolly 1999, 112-13 on the “use of language as a self-deluding practice of
signification” in the language of assassins and security police who carried out
the violent and murderous practices of South African apartheid.
xi. See Hayner 2001, 267, note 21. Hayner reports that more recent
commissions, like those in Guatemala and Haiti, have placed more emphasis
on sexual violations of women.
xii. The original passage in Feinberg 1980, 151 reads: “To respect a person,
then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of
him as a potential maker of claims.”
xiii. The dangers of adaptive preferences (or in an older idiom “false
consciousness”) are mentioned repeatedly by contributors in Nussbaum and
Glover 1995. See Nussbaum 1995, 91; Glover 1995, 123; O’Neill 1995, 142;
Sen 1995, 260; and Okin 1995, 292. Both Martha Nussbaum 2000, Chapter 2
and Amartya Sen 1999, 58-64 stress adaptive or distorted preferences in
demonstrating the defects of “preference satisfaction” as a measure of wellbeing in utilitarian ethics and economics.
xiv. Peterson and Runyan 1993, 132-3, discusses gendered nationalism. See
also Narayan 1997, Chapters 1 and 2, on gendered nationalism, as well as
how feminists may adopt perspectives on women in Atraditional societies@
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that are complicit with conservative or fundamentalist forces in those
societies that aim to control women through invocations of Atradition@ and
Aculture.@
xv. Philosopher Annette Baier in the second of her Carus Lectures on
AIntention@ (Baier 1997) gives a striking account of the intimate relations
between learning to give accounts and being capable of intentional, and so
morally assessable action.
xvi. This paper was originally presented as an invited plenary address to the
Southeast Women’s Studies Association Conference “Women’s Rights are
Human Rights” at Florida Atlantic University on March 16, 2001. I would like
to thank the organizers of SEWSA for providing the original occasion to work
out these ideas. This paper is a slightly revised version of that presentation. A
shorter version of this presentation was given at The First Feast, the first
annual meeting of the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory in
October, 2001. Another version was presented to the Gender studies School
at the University of Leuven in March, 2002. I thank Professor Veerle Draulans
for the invitation to offer these ideas there.
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